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Many governments around the world—including Australia, Britain, Swe-
den, Mexico, China, Chile—have shifted from pure pay-as-you-go
(PAYGO) tax ﬁnanced Social Security pensions to plans that rely in whole
or in part on investments in stocks and bonds. There is now active discus-
sion about the desirability of doing so in the United States. The Clinton ad-
ministration came close to proposing such a plan. President Bush estab-
lished a bipartisan presidential commission to advise on detailed aspects
of such a plan and, after his reelection in 2004, reiterated his intention to
introduce legislation to change Social Security in this way.
Any consideration of introducing an investment-based component into
Social Security immediately raises the issue of the risk associated with un-
certain asset returns. Some individuals would welcome the opportunity to
achieve a higher return on their Social Security contributions, even if that
entails accepting additional market risk. Others would be reluctant to sub-
ject their retirement income to the uncertainty of investment returns. More
generally, individuals diﬀer in the extent to which they would accept addi-
tional risk in exchange for higher returns.
This chapter presents a new market-based approach to reducing the risk
of investment-based Social Security that could be tailored to individual
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policy of SSA, any agency of the federal government, or of the NBER.risk preferences. With this new form of risk reduction, substituting an in-
vestment-based personal retirement account (PRA) for the traditional
pure PAYGO plan could achieve both a signiﬁcantly higher expected re-
tirement income and a very high probability that the investment-based an-
nuity would be at least as large as the PAYGO beneﬁt. A key feature of the
approach developed here is a guarantee that the individual would not lose
any of the real value of each year’s PRA savings and might be guaranteed
to earn at least some minimum real rate of return.
In one example of such a plan that is presented later in this chapter, I ex-
amine the eﬀect of replacing the current 12.4 percent PAYGO tax with a
mixed plan that has a 6.2 percent PAYGO tax and 6.2 percent annual PRA
savings. This new mixed plan, when fully phased in, would have the fol-
lowing desirable characteristics:
• The median value of the combined retirement income (i.e., the sum of
the PAYGO beneﬁt and the PRA annuity) would be 147 percent of the
traditional PAYGO beneﬁt.
• There would be a 95 percent probability that the combined retirement
income (the PAYGO beneﬁt and the PRA annuity) exceeds the tradi-
tional PAYGO beneﬁt.
• There would be less than 1 chance in 100 that the combined retirement
income would be less than 96 percent of the traditional PAYGO bene-
ﬁt.
• Each year’s PRA saving would be guaranteed to earn at least a 1 per-
cent real rate of return between the time that it is saved and its value at
age sixty-six (and generally substantially more). I, therefore, refer to
this as a “Nose Lose” plan.
• The variable annuity purchased at age sixty-six would have a similar
“No Lose” feature, that is, a guaranteed real rate of return of at least
1 percent.
Section 6.1 of the chapter discusses alternative approaches to risk re-
duction in investment-based Social Security plans. Section 6.2 summarizes
a private market approach to risk reduction that I reported on in an earlier
paper. Section 6.3 presents the idea of the “No Lose” plan, developed in
the current chapter, in which private markets provide a guarantee based on
Treasury inﬂation protected bonds. Simulation results for these alternative
plans are then presented and discussed in sections 6.4 and 6.5 where the
distribution of the combined pension income of the mixed plan (PAYGO
plus PRA) is compared to the projected “benchmark” beneﬁts of the cur-
rent pure PAYGO plan. An alternative approach that permits tailoring the
risk distribution to individual preferences by using the purchase and sale
of equal value (i.e., self-ﬁnancing) derivatives is analyzed in section 6.6.
Section 6.7 shows the eﬀect of lowering the combined PAYGO and PRA
cost as a way of modeling the adjustment that would be needed to deal with
202 Martin Feldsteinthe aging of the population without the large rise in the payroll tax that
would otherwise be required.
6.1 Alternative Approaches to Risk Reduction
The risk borne by retirees in an investment-based plan can be thought of
as the variability of the retirement income or as the probability that the re-
tirement income will fall substantially short of the current-law PAYGO
beneﬁts. In previous papers, Elena Ranguelova, Andrew Samwick, and I
assessed the magnitude of the risk in a pure investment-based plan and
evaluated the eﬀects of some of the ways of reducing that risk (Feldstein,
Ranguelova, and Samwick 2001; Feldstein and Ranguelova 2001b).
One way in which the investment risk to individual retirees could, in
principle, be reduced would be for the government to accumulate the in-
vestment in a single national fund. The government could use the invest-
ment returns from this fund to ﬁnance deﬁned beneﬁts, making up any
shortfall with tax revenue or government borrowing. Such a central fund
involves problems of its own that lie beyond the scope of this chapter.1I will
assume, therefore, that the investment-based plans are all structured
through PRAs. In all of these plans, individuals or their employers con-
tribute to their PRAs during their working years and receive an annuity at
retirement. The accumulated assets of individuals who die before reaching
retirement age are assumed to be bequeathed according to the instructions
of the deceased.
Strategies for reducing the risk of investment-based PRA plans involve
various forms and mixtures of the following four approaches:
1. Restrictions on the investment assets




I will comment now on each of these.
All actual and proposed investment-based plans restrict the assets in
which the PRAs can be invested. These restrictions generally preclude in-
vesting in individual stocks by requiring that equity investments be limited
to broadly diversiﬁed mutual funds. Asset restrictions may also set maxi-
mum fractions of the portfolio or of new saving that can be invested in eq-
uities. The analysis in this chapter considers the eﬀect of using Treasury In-
ﬂation-Protected Securities (TIPS) to introduce a risk-free real return as a
component of the PRA investment.
While some countries have opted for a pure investment-based plan (e.g.,
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1. See my discussion of these problems in Feldstein (2000).Chile and Mexico), most countries have chosen a mixed system that com-
bines PAYGO beneﬁts and investment-based annuities. The three proposals
analyzed by the President’s Commission were of this form. The current
analysis will focus on plans in which traditional PAYGO beneﬁts provide
half of the beneﬁts projected in current law with additional beneﬁts pro-
vided by the PRA annuity.
In our earlier papers, Elena Ranguelova, Andrew Samwick, and I ana-
lyzed a variety of government guarantees. A typical guarantee would stipu-
late that the government would supplement the income of retirees if
the combined annual annuity payment fell below some level. To avoid the
moral hazard problem of inducing individuals to take excessive risk, the
government supplement would be based on the return on a “standard port-
folio” like a 60:40 mix of the Standard and Poors 500 and the Lehman bond
index. To make individuals cost-conscious about the annuity provider, the
guarantee might take the form of allowing the individual to keep some
fraction of the investment-based annuity (say 25 percent) and then supple-
menting the annuity if the remaining portion does not reach some level.
Our earlier analysis showed that providing a guarantee that individuals
will receive at least as much as the beneﬁts projected in current law (the
“benchmark beneﬁts”) would impose relatively little risk on future tax-
payers. Nevertheless, critics of such plans worry that guarantees could be
modiﬁed in the future to create expensive new entitlements. The current
study, therefore, focuses on guarantees that could be provided by private ﬁ-
nancial markets.
6.2 A Private Market Solution: Accumulated Pension Collars
A speciﬁc proposal for a private market guarantee based on a system of
puts and calls is presented in Feldstein and Ranguelova (2001a). That paper
analyzed the potential experience of an individual who contracts at age
twenty-one to deposit a fraction of his or her earnings each year in a PRA
with the funds invested in a 60:40 portfolio of stocks and bonds. The accu-
mulated funds are used at age sixty-six to ﬁnance a variable annuity invested
in the same asset mix. This PRA investment is combined with a traditional
PAYGO system that provides beneﬁts equal to two-thirds of the projected
“benchmark” beneﬁts. The individual augments this combination with a
put contract that provides that the sum of the PAYGO beneﬁt, and the an-
nual PRA annuity would be at least as large as the benchmark beneﬁt, that
is, that the PRA annuity would be at least equal to one-third of the bench-
mark beneﬁt. The put contract would be part of the package provided by the
seller of the PRA investment. To ﬁnance the cost of this put, the individual
in eﬀect sells a call that gives the buyer of the call any PRA annuity pay-
ments in excess of an amount that makes the value of the call equal to the
value of the put. In short, the guarantee is based on purchasing a zero-cost
“collar,” that is, a combination of puts and calls of equal value.
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the PRA annuity and the PAYGO beneﬁt would at least equal the bench-
mark beneﬁt is conceptually interesting, it is not an operationally feasible
strategy in practice because it requires individuals at the time that they en-
ter the labor force to know the future path of their earnings. Only with this
knowledge can they contract the amounts that they will save and calculate
the size of the future PAYGO benchmark beneﬁt.
6.3 An Annual Contract “No Lose” PRA Plan
The current analysis, therefore, develops an alternative approach to a
market-based guarantee that could be implemented in practice. The key
to this is that the guarantee is purchased each year based on that year’s
PRA savings. The basic contract would guarantee the individual a “No
Lose” investment, that is, that the real value of the PRA account at age
sixty-six will be at least equal to the amount that the individual con-
tributed during each year of his or her working life. More speciﬁcally, the
amount saved in each year would be guaranteed to retain at least its real
value by age sixty-six. Such a guarantee could be provided by the ﬁrm that
manages the PRA product (i.e., the mutual fund, bank, insurance com-
pany, etc.). The PRA legislation might require the PRA manager to oﬀer
such an option. Alternatively, the oﬀer of such options might be voluntary.
Similarly, individuals might be free to accept such an option only if they
want or might be required to select such a guarantee on all or part of their
PRA saving. We do not examine these issues but show the eﬀect of such a
guarantee on the possible levels of retirement income relative to the tradi-
tional PAYGO beneﬁt.
The simplest way to achieve such a No Lose PRA account would be to
combine TIPS (which have a guaranteed real return) with equities. The
fraction of the annual PRA saving that would have to be invested in TIPS
to guarantee that the annual PRA saving would retain its real value by age
sixty-six depends on the age of the saver and the rate of return on the TIPS
of the relevant maturity. For example, if the saver is twenty-one years old
and the real return on TIPS is 2 percent, a $1,000 PRA saving would be di-
vided between $410 in TIPS and the remaining $590 in equities. The 2 per-
cent real return and the forty-ﬁve-year investment period imply that the
$410 would accumulate to $1,000 at the initial price level by age sixty-six.
Even if the equity portion became completely worthless, the PRA account
would be worth the initial $1,000 real dollars.2
At older working ages, there are fewer years for the TIPS to accumulate
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2. The supply of TIPS created by the Treasury is already being supplemented by privately
issued inﬂation protected bonds issued by several ﬁnancial ﬁrms. (See Wall Street Journal,
July 28, 2004, D1.) The no-risk character of those bonds could be enhanced by requiring that
the issuers have appropriate guarantees backed by capital. An appropriate derivatives market
in long-term inﬂation options could facilitate the expansion of this private market.and, therefore, a larger fraction of the initial saving must be invested in
TIPS. For example, a forty-year-old would have to invest $598 out of each
$1,000 of new saving in TIPS to guarantee the $1,000 value of the account
at age sixty-six with the remaining $402 invested in equities.
In practice, of course, the value at age sixty-six of the annual PRA sav-
ing would be worth substantially more than the guaranteed amount be-
cause the equity portion of the account would add substantial value.
Consider, for example, the forty-year-old. The $598 in TIPS would be
worth $1,000 at age sixty-six. If the $402 in equities earned a 7 percent
real return (approximately the average historic real return over the past
half century), the $402 would grow to $2,335, making the total value of
that year’s account $3,335, more than three times the guaranteed
amount.
When the individual reaches age sixty-six, all of the forty-ﬁve annual
PRA accounts would be combined to provide a single PRA retirement
fund. The individual could then buy a conventional ﬁxed rate annuity or a
variable annuity. Alternatively, the No Lose approach could be continued
in the annuity phase of the retirement plan. The annuity provider could
oﬀer a guarantee that the annual annuity payments would be at least as
large as the individual’s retirement fund could purchase with a zero real re-
turn. The annuity provider could achieve this guarantee with the appro-
priate mix of TIPS and equities. The expected return would, of course,
again be much larger than the guaranteed minimum.
There is an alternative way of achieving a zero real return during both
the accumulation phase and the annuity phase. The individual in each
working year could purchase a real annuity with a guarantee that the re-
turn on the funds saved in that year would provide at least as large a real
annuity starting at age sixty-seven as would be available with a zero real
rate of interest during both the accumulation and annuity phases. This
“lifetime contract” has more funds invested in equities during the annuity
phase than the “two stage” process that guarantees the accumulated value
at age sixty-six and then uses that to buy the annuity with the zero real re-
turn guarantee.
This approach can be easily modiﬁed to increase the guarantee from a
zero real return (No Lose) to a 1 percent real rate of return. For a forty-
year-old, $1,000 saved in a PRA would grow at a 1 percent real rate of re-
turn to a real $1,295 at age sixty-six. To guarantee at least this amount at
age sixty-six by using TIPS with a 2 percent yield would require purchas-
ing $774 of TIPS. The reduction in the equity investment from $402 (in the
zero real guarantee case) to $226 with a 1 percent real guarantee shows the
nature of the trade-oﬀ between risk reduction and return reduction. If
the $226 earned the historic average of 7 percent, it would grow to $1,312
by age sixty-six, making the total value of the account $2,607. This com-
pares with an expected value of $3,335 with a zero real guarantee.
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We simulate the distribution of the accumulated pension assets at age
sixty-six in a fully phased-in plan on the basis of the means, variances, and
covariances of the returns on equities measured by the Standard and Poors
500 from 1946 to 2003 and on bonds by the Lehman corporate bond re-
turns for 1973 to 2003. The mean log real returns are 6.9 percent for equi-
ties and 4.4 percent for corporate bonds. We subtract 40 basis points from
the mean returns to reﬂect potential administrative costs.3
The distributions of pension incomes are based on 10,000 simulations
for each plan that we study. Each simulation begins by drawing a mean rate
of return for the proposed mix of stocks and corporate bonds during the
individual’s lifetime. This mean is drawn from a normal distribution with
a mean equal to the estimated mean from the sample of observations and
a standard deviation that equals the standard error of that mean. Condi-
tional on this mean, we draw eighty annual rates of return corresponding
to the potential returns at ages 21 through 100. These returns are assumed
to be normally distributed and serially independent.4 The TIPS are as-
sumed to deliver a sure real return of 2 percent.5
Each of the annual PRA accounts evolves in this way to age sixty-six. At
that point, we aggregate the individual accounts and purchase a variable
annuity. The annuity is subject to a No Lose guarantee that the annual ben-
eﬁts are at least as large as would be achieved with a zero real return. Al-
ternatively we calculate the “lifetime contract” annuities based on a guar-
anteed real annuity from each year’s PRA saving, which are then added
together during the annuity phase.
6.5 Comparison of Alternative PRA Pensions 
Relative to the PAYGO Benchmark
Our basic analysis compares the retirement annuities produced by
diﬀerent PRA plans with the level of beneﬁts associated with the PAYGO
plan with a 12.4 percent payroll tax. For the sake of speciﬁcity, we consider
an individual who earns $25,000 at age twenty-one and whose earnings
then rise at 2 percent a year in real terms to $60,950 at age sixty-six. We as-
sume that the beneﬁts at age sixty-seven are then 40 percent of the earnings
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3. Actual variable annuity plans like TIAA-CREF have lower cost despite marketing ex-
penses.
4. See Feldstein and Ranguelova (2001b) for a detailed description of the simulation ap-
proach and the relation between the parameters of the log returns and the corresponding pa-
rameters in levels.
5. The actual return on TIPS currently (November 2004) varies between 0.8 percent at ﬁve
years and 2.1 percent at twenty-ﬁve years. Our analysis does not vary the TIP return by ma-
turity. This return has varied over time. Six months earlier it was 1.1 percent at ﬁve years and
2.25 percent at twenty-ﬁve years.at age sixty-six. Although a 40 percent replacement rate is standard for an
individual with a median level of lifetime income, 40 percent is higher than
such an individual would receive in retirement beneﬁts at the $60,950 level
of immediate preretirement income. The 40 percent replacement is in-
tended as a rough approximation to the combined eﬀects of pre-sixty-seven
mortality, beneﬁts for a retired spouse, survivor beneﬁts, and so on.6
The ﬁrst row of table 6.1 shows the relative beneﬁt distribution corre-
sponding to a mixed plan with a tax rate of 6.2 percent and a PRA saving
rate of 6.2 percent. All of the PRA funds are invested in equities (the Stan-
dard and Poors 500) with no guarantee. The PAYGO part of the plan, ﬁ-
nanced with a 6.2 percent tax rate, would provide beneﬁts equal to half of
the benchmark level. The data show that with no guarantee, the mixed plan
with a pure equity PRA investment produces a median combined beneﬁt
equal to 2.61 times the benchmark.7 There is only a 1 percent chance that
the combined beneﬁt would be less than 74 percent of the benchmark.
Some individuals with low risk aversion might prefer to have no guarantee,
accepting the risk of a low combined beneﬁt in order to have a chance to
get a high combined beneﬁt and secure in the knowledge that the PAYGO
beneﬁt will provide 50 percent of the benchmark beneﬁt.
Others, however, would be prepared to sacriﬁce some of the potential
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6. All of the calculations of relative beneﬁts for this representative individual do not depend
on the speciﬁc level of income.
7. This is higher than the ratios reported in earlier studies with Ranguelova and Samwick
because those studies used a PRA investment equal to 60 percent equities and 40 percent
debt.
Table 6.1 Guarantee based on combination with Treasury inﬂation-protected
securities (TIPS); (frequency distribution of combined pension income
relative to benchmark pay-as-you-go beneﬁts with benchmark T   12.4);
(T   6.2 S   6.2)
Real rate of
return guarantee 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.30 0.50 0.70 0.90
None 0.74 0.93 1.08 1.71 2.61 4.38 10.28
Two-stage 
guarantee
No lose (r   0) 0.90 0.99 1.06 1.36 1.80 2.66 5.73
No lose (r   1) 0.96 1.01 1.05 1.22 1.47 1.94 3.58
Lifetime contract 
guarantee
No lose (r   0) 0.82 0.91 1.00 1.43 2.14 3.58 8.62
No lose (r   1) 0.90 0.95 1.01 1.27 1.69 2.57 5.63
Notes:Combined pension income at age 77 based on PAYGO equal to 0.5 benchmark beneﬁt
and personal retirement accounts invested in equities with TIPS to achieve the return guar-
antee. Benchmark based on pay-as-you-go with T   12.4.high return in order to reduce the risk of relatively low beneﬁts. Row (2) of
table 6.1 shows the eﬀect of the No Lose plan with a guarantee that the an-
nual real return would be at least zero. The PRA funds are invested in a mix
of equities (the Standard and Poors 500) and TIPS; there are no corporate
bonds. The calculation is based on the two-stage approach: the TIPS are
selected to guarantee a No Lose accumulation (zero real return) to age
sixty-six, and the accumulated funds are then used to buy a variable annu-
ity invested in a combination of equities and TIPS selected to give a mini-
mum zero ex ante real return.
Note ﬁrst that the median ratio of the combined beneﬁts to the bench-
mark pure PAYGO beneﬁts is 1.80. That is, there is an even chance that the
combination of the reduced PAYGO beneﬁts and the PRA annuity will be
at least 80 percent more than the basic benchmark PAYGO beneﬁt. Note
next that the 5th percentile in the distribution of the combined beneﬁts cor-
responds to 99 percent of the benchmark beneﬁts. There is thus only one
chance in twenty that the combined beneﬁts will be less than 99 percent of
the benchmark beneﬁts. There is thus only one chance in twenty that the
combined beneﬁts will be less than 99 percent of the benchmark beneﬁts.
Even at the extreme 1 percent level, the combined beneﬁts would be 90 per-
cent of the benchmark level. In short, the No Lose option oﬀers a level of
beneﬁts that is likely to be substantially higher than the benchmark bene-
ﬁt in the pure PAYGO system, and that involves only a very small risk of re-
ceiving less than 90 percent of that benchmark beneﬁt.
Note also that there is a signiﬁcant chance with this No Lose plan of re-
ceiving a great deal more than the benchmark beneﬁt. The 70th percentile
in the relative distribution corresponds to combined beneﬁts equal to more
than twice the benchmark beneﬁt; a combined annuity equal to 266 per-
cent of the benchmark beneﬁt corresponds to about 100 percent of the in-
dividual’s peak preretirement income. Similarly, there is one chance in ten
(i.e., the 90th percentile) that the combined income would be more than
ﬁve times the benchmark beneﬁt, equivalent to more than twice the peak
preretirement income.
Selecting a guarantee of a 1 percent real return during both the accu-
mulation and annuity phases instead of the zero percent reported in the
second row of table 6.1 does little to reduce the small risk at the 1st and 5th
percentiles and lowers the combined beneﬁts above that level. The impli-
cations of the 1 percent real return guarantee are shown in row (3) of table
6.1. Comparing rows (2) and (3) shows that the combined income ratio at
the 90th percentile declines from 5.7 times the benchmark beneﬁt to about
3.6 times the benchmark. The combined median income falls from 180 per-
cent of the benchmark to 147 percent of the benchmark beneﬁt, still a sub-
stantial gain relative to the current law.
In exchange for these lower payouts at the middle and top of the distri-
bution, the 1 percent real guarantee provides only slightly better protection
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cent risk that the combined beneﬁt would be more than 4 percent below the
benchmark level, not very diﬀerent from the 10 percent with the r> 0 guar-
antee.
Rows (4) and (5) are based on lifetime return guarantees instead of the
two-stage approach reported in rows (2) and (3). The individual during
each working year contributes to a PRA annuity plan that promises to pay
a positive rate of return during both the accumulations and annuity phases.
If an individual dies before retirement age, the accumulated fund is paid as
a bequest. This lifetime return guarantee approach keeps a larger share of
funds invested in equities, thereby increasing both the risk and the ex-
pected return. Comparing the two r 0 guarantees (rows [2] and [4]) shows
that the lifetime guarantee approach raises the median beneﬁt from 1.8
times the benchmark to 2.14 times the benchmark. The 90th percentile
rises from 5.73 times the benchmark to 8.62 times the benchmark, but the
1st percentile declines from 90 percent of the benchmark to 82 percent.
None of the ﬁve distributions clearly dominates. A distribution with
higher upside potential also has a greater probability of a low beneﬁt. Indi-
viduals with diﬀerent degrees of risk aversion will, therefore, have diﬀerent
preferences among these three options. One way to represent these prefer-
ences is by the expected utility of the diﬀerent options using a constant rel-
ative risk aversion utility function. We do expected utility calculations for
individuals for constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) values of 1 through
5 at ages sixty-seven, seventy-seven, eighty-seven, and ninety-seven and
then combine these with weights reﬂecting survival probabilities to these
ages. The expected utility calculations, therefore, do not take into account
the value of the bequests that might occur under these diﬀerent plans.
We ﬁnd that the No Lose option with a zero guaranteed return (row [2])
is preferred to the less risky 1 percent guarantee for every CRRA value be-
tween 1 and 5, a not surprising result in light of the distribution of returns
shown in table 6.1. More surprising, however, is that the No Guarantee op-
tion (row [1]) is preferred to the No Lose zero return option of row (2) for
every CRRA value between 1 and 5. Because there is a substantial risk of
a quite low combined beneﬁt, this suggests that the upside gain potential
outweighs this risk even for those with high risk aversion.
With the lifetime contract approach (rows [4] and [5]), the zero real re-
turn guarantee is again preferred to the 1 percent guarantee for all CRRA
values, just as it is for the two-stage approach. Comparing the two diﬀer-
ent ways of achieving the zero real return guarantee shows that the ex-
pected utility is higher with the lifetime guarantee for CRRA values up
to 3.5, presumably because it permits more risk-taking. Even with that
greater risk-taking implied by the lifetime contract approach, individuals
continue to prefer the no guarantee option (row [1]) to either of the lifetime
contract options.
210 Martin FeldsteinIn the overall comparison of the No Guarantee and the four diﬀerent
guarantees shown in table 6.1, the expected utility comparisons show that
No Guarantee is preferred for all of the CRRA values up to 5.0. The life-
time contracts and the 1 percent negative return are dominated.
Finally, a calculation comparing the expected utility of these ﬁve plans
to the expected utility of the pure PAYGO beneﬁt that pays 100 percent of
the benchmark shows that for all of the risk aversion values between 1 and
5, the investment based plans are preferred to the pure PAYGO plan.
6.6 Tailoring the Guarantees to Individual 
Preferences with Zero-Cost Collars
It is possible to extend the range of options in a way that could make a
guarantee plan preferable to the No Guarantee option. More speciﬁcally,
using a combination of puts and calls in which the cost of the put is ﬁ-
nanced by selling a call, that is, a zero-cost collar, allows diﬀerent ways of
shaping the two tails of the distribution, depending on how the put and call
are speciﬁed. In this way, the risk protection can be tailored to diﬀerent
groups of PRA participants.
To see why this might be a preferred option, consider row (2) of table 6.1.
These ﬁgures show that with the No Lose real return guarantee the indi-
vidual has a 10 percent chance of getting a retirement income equal to al-
most six times the benchmark beneﬁt. Although such a large windfall
would no doubt be welcome, a risk averse individual might be willing to
forego some of that very high end possibility for a reduced risk of relatively
low beneﬁts and improved distribution of outcomes in the ﬁrst 50 percent
of the probability distribution.
One way to achieve that alternative distribution would be to buy a put
option that guarantees a real return of at least zero and to ﬁnance the cost
of this put by selling a call option that gives its buyer all of the value above
some cumulative real rate of return. Such a put-call strategy that caps the
upside rate of return in order to purchase a put that guarantees at least a
zero real return would have a diﬀerent distribution of combined pension
incomes than a zero real return guarantee achieved with TIPS (because
that does not put a cap on the maximum possible rate of return.)
This strategy can be extended to consider zero-cost collars that guaran-
tee other minimum positive or negative real rates of return. On the basis of
some preliminary analysis, the analysis here focuses on zero-cost collars for
minimum real returns of zero and minus 1 percent.
Table 6.2 compares the distributions shown in table 6.1 for the no guar-
antee option (row [1]) and the zero real return option achieved with TIPS
(row [2]) to the distributions using puts to guarantee minimum returns of
zero (row [3]) and minus one (row [4]) ﬁnanced by selling calls on all of the
returns above the level needed to ﬁnance those puts.
Reducing the Risk of Investment-Based Social Security Reform 211It is clear that a risk averse individual might well prefer a collar strategy
with a minimum guarantee of minus 1 percent return to the TIPS zero re-
turn guarantee or to no guarantee at all. With this collar strategy, there is
only a 1 percent chance of receiving less than the benchmark beneﬁt. The
beneﬁt is higher at each point in the distribution up to at least the 50th
percentile. At the 90th percentile, the individual forsakes the one-in-ten
chance of a beneﬁt that is more than ﬁve times the benchmark (and, there-
fore, more than twice maximum preretirement income) but still can antic-
ipate a beneﬁt that is twice the benchmark.
This is borne out by the expected utility calculations. In a mixed system
with a 6.2 percent PAYGO tax and a 6.2 percent PRA saving rate, an indi-
vidual with CRRA less than or equal to four will prefer to invest their PRA
in equities with no guaranteed return. But with a higher degree of risk aver-
sion, the individual prefers to forego the potential high return for a mini-
mum return of at least minus one percent.
There are, of course, other collars that might be preferred to this. For ex-
ample, one possible strategy would sell a call that pays (say) 50 percent of
the equity returns above some level and use the proceeds of that call option
to buy a put that guarantees at least a minus 1 percent real return.
6.7 Lower Cost Mixed Plans: Limiting the Tax Increase
A primary goal of Social Security reform is to avoid the large increase in
the tax rate that will result from the aging of the population if there is no
program change. The Social Security actuaries estimate that the existing
beneﬁt rules would require raising the tax rate in the PAYGO system by
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Table 6.2 Guarantee based on zero-cost collar (frequency distribution of combined
pension income relative to benchmark pay-as-you-go beneﬁts with
benchmark T   12.4); (T   6.2 S   6.2)
Real rate of 
return guarantee 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.30 0.50 0.70 0.90




No lose (r   0) 0.90 0.99 1.06 1.36 1.80 2.66 5.73
Zero-cost collar
guarantee
No lose (r   0) 0.94 1.01 1.13 1.56 1.81 1.85 1.86
r    1 0.99 1.08 1.23 1.73 2.00 2.06 2.06
Notes:Combined pension income at age 77 based on PAYGO equal to 0.5 benchmark beneﬁt
and personal retirement accounts invested in equities with Treasury inﬂation-protected secu-
rities (TIPS) or zero-cost collar to achieve the return guarantee. Benchmark based on pay-as-
you-go with T   12.4.about 50 percent, from 12.4 percent to about 18.6 percent.8 An advantage
of the investment-based approach is that it is possible to ﬁnance the bene-
ﬁts implied by the existing beneﬁt rules with a lower future cost.
A useful way to analyze the implication of the long-run demographically
caused increase in the cost of producing the beneﬁts in a pure PAYGO sys-
tem is to consider the impact on beneﬁts of cutting the PAYGO tax by one-
third with a pure PAYGO system. A pure PAYGO system with a tax rate
equal to two-thirds of the current PAYGO 12.4 percent, that is, an 8.3 per-
cent combined tax rate, would show the one-third decline in beneﬁts rela-
tive to the currently projected “benchmark” beneﬁts that would be occur
as a result of the demographic change. In contrast, a mixture of a PAYGO
tax and a PRA contribution that totals 8.3 percent would show the extent
to which it is possible to reduce the beneﬁt shortfall with no increase in the
total cost when the system is fully phased in.
Analysis of such a mixed plan with a 4.15 percent PAYGO tax and a 4.15
percent PRA saving rate showed that the expected beneﬁt would exceed
the current beneﬁt but that there would be a signiﬁcant probability that
beneﬁts would be less than 75 percent of the benchmark beneﬁt.
The current section, therefore, presents results for a plan that reduces
costs by 20 percent instead of by the one-third needed to stabilize the im-
plied tax rate. One way to interpret this would be as the net eﬀect of reduc-
ing the payroll tax by one-third (from 12.4 percent to 8.3 percent, to stabi-
lize the implied future tax rate) and dividing this between a PAYGO
portion of 4.96 percent and a carve-out to PRA accounts of 3.35 percent
supplemented by individual PRA contributions of an additional 1.61 per-
cent, bringing the total to 9.92 percent or 80 percent of the current 12.4
percent.9 This would be equivalent to a future cost increase from 12.4 per-
cent to 14.9 percent (instead of the 18.6 percent rate implied by the 50
percent cost rise that would occur with a pure PAYGO system) with 2.5
percent of payroll paid as an individual contribution on top of the tax.
Table 6.3 shows results similar to table 6.1 except that the PAYGO and
PRA costs have now both been reduced to 80 percent of what they were in
table 6.1. Consider ﬁrst the results for the No Guarantee plan in line (1).
The median level of the beneﬁts in this probability distribution is still sub-
stantially higher than the benchmark distribution: 2.09 times the bench-
mark.
At the 10th percentile, the new low-cost strategy with no guarantee pro-
duces a combined beneﬁt equal to 86 percent of the benchmark. But at the
1st percentile, the combined beneﬁts in the low-cost plan are only 59 per-
Reducing the Risk of Investment-Based Social Security Reform 213
8. The calculation is more complex because of disability beneﬁts that are now ﬁnanced as
part of the 12.4 percent.
9. The individual contribution could be induced on a voluntary basis by making the carve-
out transfer to the PRA account conditional on the additional individual contribution. Mak-
ing the individual contribution the “default option” would increase the participation rate.cent of the benchmark, a level that some would consider an uncomfortably
high level of risk.
The second and third rows of table 6.3 show how much the risk can be
reduced by introducing guaranteed annual rates of return in a two-stage
plan. A No Lose annual guarantee of a real return greater than zero raises
the combined beneﬁt at the 1st percentile from 59 percent of the bench-
mark to 72 percent of the benchmark. The price of this risk reduction is a
decline in the relative combined beneﬁts starting at about the 10th per-
centile. Thus, at the 30th percentile, the combined beneﬁt declines from
137 percent of the benchmark to 109 percent. At the median, the drop is
from 2.1 times the benchmark to 1.44 times benchmark. The prospect for
very high gains falls even more.
Giving up more of the upside beneﬁts by requiring at least a 1 percent
real return on each year’s PRA savings improves the very low probability
ratios only slightly and reduces the combined beneﬁts at all higher per-
centiles. Row (3) of table 6.3 shows that an annual guarantee of r 1 raises
the 1st percentile only from 0.72 with r   0 to 0.77. Higher points on the
distribution show the kinds of beneﬁt decreases associated with these small
risk reductions.
Rows (4) and (5) of table 6.3 repeat these calculations for the lifetime an-
nuity plans. Because these involve a generally larger equity proportion in
the PRA account, they have higher risk than rows (2) and (3).
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Table 6.3 Low cost mixed plans (Frequency distribution of combined pension
income relative to benchmark pay-as-you-go beneﬁts with benchmark 
T   12.4); (T   4.96 S   4.96)
Real rate of 
return guarantee 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.30 0.50 0.70 0.90
None 0.59 0.74 0.86 1.37 2.09 3.50 8.22
Two-stage 
guarantee
No lose (r   0) 0.72 0.79 0.85 1.09 1.44 2.13 4.58
No lose (r   1) 0.77 0.81 0.84 0.98 1.17 1.55 2.86
Lifetime contract
guarantee
No lose (r   0) 0.65 0.73 0.80 1.15 1.71 2.87 6.89
No lose (r   1) 0.72 0.76 0.81 1.02 1.35 2.06 4.50
Zero-cost collar 
guarantee
No lose (r   0) 0.75 0.81 0.90 1.25 1.45 1.48 1.49
r    1 0.79 0.86 0.98 1.39 1.60 1.65 1.65
Notes:Combined pension income at age 77 based on PAYGO beneﬁts equal to 0.4 benchmark
beneﬁt and personal retirement accounts invested in equities with Treasury inﬂation-pro-
tected securities or zero cost collars to achieve the return guarantee. Benchmark based on
pay-as-you-go with T   12.4.The last two rows of table 6.3 use a collar to reduce risk by guaranteeing
a minimum return of at least minus 1 percent on each year’s savings and ﬁ-
nance that put option by selling returns above a rate of return with an equal
Black-Scholes value. This zero-cost collar has the eﬀect of limiting the
maximum beneﬁt to 1.65 times the benchmark but uses this limit to raise
the low probability level to 98 percent of the benchmark at 10 percent and
79 percent at the 1 percent level.
The implication of table 6.3 is that a mixed system with a cost that is 20
percent lower than the cost required with a pure PAYGO plan, when com-
bined with a zero-cost collar that gives up the possibility of very high ben-
eﬁts in order to reduce the risk of low beneﬁts, could provide beneﬁts that
are likely to be substantially higher than the current law benchmark and
that have only a very small probability of being less than the current law
benchmark. More speciﬁcally, using a zero-cost collar that guarantees that
the real return on each year’s saving is not less than minus 1 percent implies
a median beneﬁt equal to 1.6 times the benchmark and that there is only
once chance in 10 that the beneﬁt would be less than 98 percent of the
benchmark and only one chance in one hundred that it would be less than
79 percent of the benchmark.
The expected utility ranking of the alternatives in table 6.3 imply that in-
dividuals with a CRRA value up to 4.0 would prefer to have no guarantee,
while those with higher risk aversion prefer the collar approach with a
guarantee of minus one. Those with a higher risk aversion would prefer the
collar approach with a guarantee of minus 1 percent.
The ﬁnal calculations, presented in table 6.4, show the implication of
dealing with demographic change with a system that, when fully phased in,
is purely investment-based with no PAYGO component. More speciﬁcally,
we assume that the accumulation is based on annual saving of 9.92 percent
of payroll, which is fully invested in equities except to the extent that a
guarantee is provided by the use of TIPS or zero-cost collars.10 With no
guarantee, this pure investment-based plan has a 1 percent probability of
a beneﬁt that is less than 38 percent of the benchmark and a 5 percent
probability that the beneﬁt is less than 68 percent of the benchmark. A
TIPS-based two-stage strategy that guarantees that each year’s saving will
have a positive real return substantially reduces this risk, raising the 1 per-
cent level to 64 percent of the benchmark and the 5 percent level to 79 per-
cent of the benchmark.
The risk can be reduced even more by the zero-cost collar that guaran-
tees a real return of at least minus 1 percent on each year’s saving by giving
up any prospect of returns that would produce a beneﬁt equal to more than
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10. A method of transition from the existing PAYGO system to a pure investment-based
system in a way that does not require more than an additional 2 percent of payroll each year
during the transition (equal to less than 1 percent of gross domestic product [GDP]) is pre-
sented in Feldstein and Samwick (1998).2.5 times the benchmark. With this collar, there is only a 1 percent risk of
beneﬁts that are less than 79 percent of the benchmark. The 5 percent risk
level corresponds to 93 percent of the benchmark, and the 10 percent risk
level is 116 percent of the benchmark.
An explicit expected utility calculation implies that with a CRRA value
equal to 2.5 or less, the individual would prefer the pure equity investment
with no guarantee. With CRRA values with 3 or more, the individual
would choose the zero-cost collar with the guaranteed real return of at
least minus 1 percent. The progression as risk aversion increases is thus
from a more-risky to a less-risky approach.
For each CRRA value, the expected utility of the pure investment based
plans with the 9.92 percent of payroll saving and with the utility maximiz-
ing guarantees exceeds the expected value with mixed system with taxes
and PRA contributions of 4.46 percent of payroll. Additional calculations
would be needed to consider the path of transition before deciding whether
the extra cost in the transition to a pure investment-based system is justi-
ﬁed by the higher level of long-run expected utility.
Two other expected utility calculations are worth mentioning. In the
mixed plans with PAYGO taxes equal to PRA saving and with no guaran-
tees, the expected utility of PRA investments that are 100 percent in equi-
ties exceeds the expected utility of PRA investments divided between equi-
ties and corporate debt in the ratio of 60 to 40. In contrast, in a pure
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Table 6.4 Low cost pure investment plans (frequency distribution of combined
pension income relative to benchmark pay-as-you-go beneﬁts with
benchmark T   12.4); (T   0 S   9.92)
Real rate of
return guarantee 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.30 0.50 0.70 0.90
None 0.38 0.68 0.93 1.94 3.38 6.21 15.65
Two-stage 
guarantee
No lose (r   0) 0.64 0.79 0.90 1.37 2.08 3.46 8.36
No lose (r   1) 0.74 0.81 0.88 1.16 1.55 2.31 4.92
Lifetime contract 
guarantee
No lose (r   0) 0.50 0.65 0.80 1.50 2.62 4.93 12.99
No lose (r   1) 0.64 0.72 0.81 1.23 1.90 3.31 8.21
Zero-cost collar 
guarantee
No lose (r   0) 0.70 0.81 1.01 1.69 2.09 2.16 2.17
r   –1 0.79 0.93 1.16 1.97 2.41 2.49 2.50
Notes: Combined pension income at age 77 based on no PAYGO beneﬁts and personal re-
tirement accounts invested in equities with Treasury Inﬂation-Protected Securities or zero
cost collars to achieve the return guarantee. Benchmark based on pay-as-you-go with T  
12.4.investment-based plan with no PAYGO component, the 100 percent equity
investment is preferred only by individuals with low risk aversion (CRRA
values up to 3.0) with the 60:40 stock bond portfolios preferred by indi-
viduals with higher CRRA values.
6.8 A Concluding Comment
This chapter has described the risks implied by a mixed system of So-
cial Security pension beneﬁts with diﬀerent combinations of PAYGO
taxes and PRA saving. The analysis showed how these risks can be re-
duced by using alternative guarantee strategies. The ﬁrst such strategy
uses a blend of equities and TIPS to guarantee at least a positive real rate
or return on each year’s PRA saving. The second is an explicit zero-cost
collar that guarantees an annual rate of return by giving up all returns
above a certain level. One variant of these guarantees uses a two-stage pro-
cedure: a guaranteed return to age sixty-six and then a separate guarantee
on the implicit return in the annuity phase. An alternative strategy pro-
vides a combined guarantee on the return during both the accumulation
and the annuity phase.
Simulations are used to derive the probability distributions of retirement
incomes relative to the “benchmark” beneﬁts speciﬁed in current law. Cal-
culations of expected utility show that these risk reduction techniques can
raise expected utility relative to the plans with no guarantees. The ability to
do so depends on the individual’s risk aversion level. This underlines the
idea that diﬀerent individuals would rationally prefer diﬀerent investment
strategies and risk reduction options.
There are, of course, other ways that both types of guarantee could be
modiﬁed that might produce higher expected utility. One line of research
that should be considered is alternative designs of the puts and calls in the
zero-cost collars. Another approach would allow adjustments in the port-
folio composition during the accumulation or annuity phase based on the
performance of the investments to that point.
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Comment David W. Wilcox
Martin Feldstein has probably done more than any other person to high-
light the urgent need to reform our Social Security system and the poten-
tial beneﬁts of putting the system on an investment-based foundation. In
addition, he has personally conducted a goodly fraction of the seminal re-
search in this area and inspired others to undertake much of the rest. To
state the obvious, this conference volume—like many of its predecessors in
this subject area—would not have come to fruition without his eﬀorts, and
the research careers of many of the participants at this conference would
not have been nearly so rich without his beneﬁcial inﬂuence. When the na-
tion ﬁnally confronts the imperative of reforming the system, much of the
thinking surrounding the ensuing debate will have been shaped directly or
indirectly by Feldstein. For all of this, we owe him an enormous debt of
gratitude.
This chapter continues in the tradition of his pushing the research fron-
tier forward. In earlier work with Ranguelova and Samwick, Feldstein pro-
posed the idea of limiting the ﬁnancial risk associated with participation in
personal retirement accounts (PRAs) by having the government provide
an explicit guarantee.1 Although the probability of a draw on taxpayer
resources struck the authors as relatively low and the associated costs in
those cases seemed manageable, the idea was criticized, partly on the ap-
prehension that once a government guarantee had been agreed to in prin-
ciple, no matter how limited in its original form, the guarantee might be en-
hanced over time, ultimately becoming a considerable new burden on
taxpayers.
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David W. Wilcox is a deputy director of the Division of Research and Statistics of the Fed-
eral Reserve Board.
The views expressed in this comment are those of the author and are not necessarily shared
by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve or by the other members of its staﬀ. I am
grateful to many colleagues for helpful comments on an earlier version of these remarks.
1. See, among others, Feldstein, Ranguelova, and Samwick (2000).